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Alternative Action Organizations: Social Solidarity or Political Advocacy? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the involvement of alternative action organizations in three forms of 
political advocacy in an attempt to gauge their degree of politicization. These forms can be 
understood as representing three different ways of making political claims: by raising public 
awareness with respect to a given cause or issue, by trying to influence the policy maker through 
“insider” lobbying activities, and by protesting in the streets as “outsiders.”  Our findings show 
strong cross-national variations in all three forms of political activities, although not always 
following a consistent pattern. They also suggest that there is a relationship between the severity 
of the economic crisis and the form of advocacy. Most importantly, our analysis suggests that the 
politicization of AAOs depends both on certain internal characteristics such as their degree of 
formalization and professionalization, as well as their thematic focus, and the scope of their 
activities, and on the broader context in terms of economic crisis, austerity policies, and political 
opportunities. As regards the latter, we find an impact especially on lobbying and protesting. 
 
 
Keywords: Alternative action organizations, politicization, raising awareness, lobbying, 
protesting 
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Alternative Action Organizations: Social Solidarity or Political Advocacy?i 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper investigates the degree of politicization of alternative action organizations during the 
economic crisis in Europe. Alternative action organizations (AAOs) can be defined as collective 
bodies which organize collective events carrying out alternatives to dominant socio-economic 
and cultural practices with visible beneficiaries and/or participants and claims on their economic 
and social well-being, including basic needs, health, and lifestyles. However, it is not clear to 
what extent they can be considered as political actors. On the one hand, they engage in a wealth 
of activities aimed at providing services for specific populations in need. On the other hand, they 
often engage in politically-oriented activities. In other words, alternative action organizations 
have both a social solidarity dimension and a political action dimension. 
Knowing the factors – at both the organizational and contextual level – favoring the 
politicization of organizations that support socially and culturally alternative ways of practicing 
economic exchanges is important because it tells us much about the conditions under which civil 
society actors become political actors. It also helps bringing together the social and political 
dimensions of such initiatives and practices. Previous research has shown that making sense of 
the interrelation of micro-macro linkages is important for making sense of political action, 
particularly in the context of the recent economic crisis (Grasso and Giugni 2016). In this paper 
we develop on this previous research by further turning to an emergent form of sociopolitical 
organizations to understand to what extent linkages between the organizational and the contextual 
level can help to explain their political involvement as well. 
In order to study their politicization, we examine the extent to which a random sample of 
AAOs in nine countries engage in political activities and what explains such a political 
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engagement. Based on theory, we include among the potential determinants both organization-
related features, such as for example their internal structures and resources, and aspects of the 
wider context. Among the latter, we are particularly interested in looking at the impact of certain 
features of the economic context and the political opportunity structures such as the severity of 
the crisis, austerity policies enacted by governments, and other features of the political-
institutional system. Multilevel modelling allows us to ascertain the effect on politicization of 
predictors pertaining to both the organizations themselves and their broader context. 
 The focus of our study is on AAOs engaging in political advocacy, as opposed to other 
types of activities such as providing service to their beneficiaries or purely internal organizational 
activities (which often are in preparation of advocacy activities). In other words, we examine the 
extent to which AAOs that provide services get involved in political activities. In this regard, we 
distinguish between three ways of engaging in advocacy: raising public awareness with respect to 
a given cause or issue, engaging in “insider” lobbying tactics, or taking part in more contentious 
protest activities as “outsiders.” These are three distinct, though not mutually exclusive, ways in 
which organizations can be politically engaged. Each of them has its own logic and might be 
accounted for by different features of the organizations themselves as well as of their broader 
environment. The aims of this paper are, firstly, to assess the extent to which AAOs engage in 
these three types of political activities and how this varies across the nine countries included in 
our study, also depending on the severity of the economic crisis faced by those countries. 
Secondly, we aim to examine whether and to what extent these forms of advocacy are associated 
with certain characteristics of AAOs such as their degree of formalization and 
professionalization, their focus on economic rather than other goals, and their scope, as well as to 
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how they are channeled through the broader context of the economic crisis, austerity policies, and 
political opportunity structures. 
   
 
The political mobilization of social solidarity 
There has been a growing interest in recent years in what is variously called social economy 
(Laville 2010), solidarity (or solidary) economy, social resilience (Batty and Cole 2010; Hall and 
Lamont 2013), or, more recently and particularly with respect to the economic crisis, alternative 
forms of resilience (Kousis and Paschou 2017). All these notions refer in some ways to 
alternative economic practices, located at the crossroad of the political and the social, initiated by 
citizen groups and networks (Kousis and Paschou 2017). They include a wide variety of 
innovative activities and social relations such as solidary bartering (Fernández Mayo 2009), local 
exchange trading schemes (Granger et al. 2010), local and alternative currencies (North 2007) 
ethical banks (Tischer 2013), local market cooperatives (Phillips 2012), cooperatives for the 
supply of social services such as in health and education (Costa et al. 2012), alternative forms of 
production (Corrado 2010), critical consumption (Fonte 2013), spontaneous actions of resistance 
and reclaim (Dalakoglou 2012), and the reproduction of cultural knowledge via oral and artistic 
expression (Lamont et al. 2013). 
In general, this body of works tends to focus on the social and economic sides of these 
kinds of initiatives and organizations. In other words, they are mostly seen as social or economic 
actors, often with a solidary aim. In this way, their political dimension is often overlooked. We 
call them alternative action organizations to denote that we believe this kind of actor to be also 
political and following recent works (Kousis et al. 2016). The action part, in particular, is meant 
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to refer to their political side. In other words, these are not simply organizations engaged in 
alternative activities and forms of production – whether social or economic – but they also have a 
political action component. This is the key assumption which we would like to submit to 
empirical scrutiny below. 
The political dimension of the kind of organizations considered here, of course, has not 
been totally neglected in previous research. Some scholarship stresses this aspect as well. Forno 
and Graziano (2014), for example, look at what they call “sustainable community movement 
organizations” following a social movement perspective to show how such new collective 
initiatives which empower consumer and producer networks on a smaller scale. Similarly, 
Andretta and Guidi’s (2017) analysis of local alternative consumerism practices in Italy also have 
a political dimension, developing alternative processes through civic food networks and leading 
to radical forms of food democracy. More generally, Kousis and Paschou (2017) underlines both 
the political and non-political features of citizens’ collective responses to hard economic times 
which may take the form of AAOs. 
Here we examine two kinds of potential determinants of the political involvement of 
AAOs. The first set of factors consists in certain internal characteristics of organizations. To help 
us identifying such organizational-related factors we can draw from the social movement 
literature and, more specifically from resource mobilization theory (see Edwards and McCarthy 
2004 for a review). This research tradition has long inquired into the internal structuring of social 
movement organizations and the importance of such factors as the amount of resources and 
degree of organization for the movements’ emergence and mobilization (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy 
and Zald 1977). In this vein, Kriesi (1996) has pointed to four aspects to be considered in the 
analysis of organizations’ development: organizational growth and decline, internal structuring, 
8 
 
external structuring, as well as goal orientations and action repertoires. Here we examine the 
impact of four organizational aspects on the politicization of AAOs which relates to their internal 
structuring and partly on their goal orientation. 
The first two aspects are intended to capture the degree of formalization and 
professionalization of AAOs. We examine, on the one hand, whether they have a written 
constitution and, on the other hand, whether they have paid staff working for the organization. 
This latter aspect to some extent also reflects the size of the organization, as larger organizations 
tend to have paid staff while smaller one are less likely to do so. Organizational size has long 
been considered by sociologists and political scientists as an important aspect to be addressed 
(see Clemens and Minkoff 2004 for a review of work on the role of organizations in social 
movement research). We may therefore expect organizational size and, more generally, 
formalization as well as professionalization to be associated to politicization. 
A third internal factor has to do with the goal orientation of AAOs. Here we refer more 
specifically to the main thematic focus of their activities. There are obviously many different 
ways to classify an organization’s goals. For this study, we capture this dimension by 
distinguishing between economic activities and other activities. To be sure, this is a very rough 
distinction that does not do justice to the variety of aims and activities of AAOs. Yet, given our 
focus on the economic crisis, it is a relevant one. Here we may generally expect AAOs that 
focuses on economic activities to be less politically oriented than other AAOs, other things being 
equal, as such a focus diverts their attention from political action. 
The fourth and final internal factor we take into account in our analysis is the scope of 
activities of AAOs. Some organizations have a local scope, while others reach out to the regional, 
national, or sometimes even supranational level. We expect the scope of action to influence their 
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degree of politicization. More specifically, we predict that local organizations will be less 
politicized than organizations that have a broader scope as they will be more focused on 
providing services than engaging in political advocacy. This should hold especially for raising 
awareness and lobbying, as these kinds of activities are more effective when there is a large 
public, respectively when they target more powerful political elites, while protest activities can 
also be effective at the local level. 
In addition to these organization-related factors, we are interested in examining the role of 
the larger context. AAOs do not act in a vacuum. Rather, their behaviour is channelled through 
certain features of their broader environment. Therefore, we expect the extent of their political 
involvement to be influenced by such contextual features. Following previous research (Giugni 
and Grasso 2016), here we focus in particular on three aspects of the context within which AAOs 
act. These three factors are aimed to capture, respectively, the severity of the economic crisis, 
austerity policies enacted by governments, and features of the political-institutional system.  
 The first two contextual factors which we expect to influence the politicization of AAOs 
refer to the severity of the crisis according to macro-economic indicators. The economic crisis 
that started in 2008 has led to growing unemployment and shrinking economic growth across 
Europe and the rest of the world (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). To get a grasp on this aspect we 
therefore rely on two standard indicators: GDP and the unemployment rate. These two indicators 
provide a measure of the severity of the crisis in terms of reduced economic growth, respectively 
in terms of rising unemployment. 
 The involvement of AAOs in politically oriented activities such as raising awareness, 
lobbying or protesting may also depend on certain features of the political-institutional context. 
Students of social movements have long shown the impact of this kind of factors pertaining to the 
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broader environment of movements as providing political opportunities for mobilization 
(Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1996; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 2011; see Kriesi 2004 
and Meyer 2004 for reviews). Factors such as the relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of elite alignments, the presence or 
absence of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression have most often been 
examined by scholars (McAdam 1996). These aspects all refer to the input side of political 
opportunity structures. Additionally, albeit more rarely, some have pointed more specifically to 
the role of public policies as a key component of political opportunity structures capturing their 
output side (Meyer 2004). Following the latter perspective, here we examine the impact of 
austerity policies as opening up or closing down opportunities for AAOs to get involved in 
political advocacy. We look more specifically at policies relating to social spending and taxation. 
Government expenses for social policies and the tax wedge may be seen as reflecting a definition 
of austerity policies as reducing government spending, especially in the social realm, and 
increasing taxation, especially on labor. They capture the output side of political opportunity 
structures. 
 While scholarship has often considered political opportunities as being “objective” 
aspects of the context that affect the mobilization of social movements, others have stressed their 
“subjective” side as well as perceived opportunities (Alimi 2007; Banaszak 1996; Kurzman 1996, 
2004; Lee 2010; McAdam 2004). Clearly, opportunities must be “framed” and perceived to have 
an impact on social movements (Gamson and Meyer 1996). We therefore expect the 
politicization of AAOs to be associated to the perception of political opportunities. More 
specifically, we look at perceptions of the stability of the political system or the perceptions of 
the effectiveness of the government play a role in this context. Again, the former may be 
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considered as an input measure of perceived opportunities, while the latter capture their output 
side. Following social movement research, such perceptions of the openness or closedness of the 
political system in terms of government stability and effectiveness should have an impact 
especially on the propensity of AAOs to get involved in protest activities. However, we also 
expect them to influence their lobbying, as this is another, more institutionalized form of political 
intervention. Activities aimed to raising awareness, in contrast, should be less directly related to 
the perceptions of political opportunity structures. 
 
Data and methods 
The data used in our analysis retrieved in the context of the project “Living with Hard Times: 
How Citizens React to Economic Crises and Their Social and Political Consequences” 
(LIVEWHAT), funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the 7th Framework 
Programme (grant agreement number 613237). They consist of a sample of 4297 AAOs whose 
characteristics such as organizational structure, aims, activities, and so forth were coded on 
information retrieved on their websites. AAOs were drawn from related national hubs/subhubs as 
identified by each national team and ranked according to two criteria: inclusiveness and diversity 
in terms of geographic origin and alternative action types coverage, along with the number of 
websites they contain. AAOs websites have been extracted from the databases of the highest 
ranked hubs/subhubs through a systematic process and the resulting national populations have 
been checked for their adequacy in terms of the abovementioned criteria, with a preview of their 
geographic dispersion and the percentages each action type contains. 
National random samples were generated from each country’s AAO websites. AAOs 
were coded only to the extent that they are active within the time frame of the recent global 
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economic crisis (i.e. at least between 2007 and 2016) and offer related information as above. A 
structured protocol was used for the coding. It included information about the organizational 
profile, activities and beneficiaries, aims and solidarity orientations, and other related information 
(see LIVEWHAT 2016 for more details). 
 Our dependent variables are meant to measure the politicization of AAOs through their 
engagement in three forms of advocacy. More precisely, we created three dummy variables based 
on information about the proposed routes to achieve their aims. The possible routes include the 
following: protest actions; direct actions; raising awareness; lobbying; policy reform, change, 
creation focusing on a number of specific issues; change government; change the establishment; 
and other routes. Here we focus on three of them: raising awareness, lobbying, and protesting. 
Each of them reflects a distinct way to make political claims: respectively, by addressing the 
public opinion, by attempting to influence the political decision-makers, and by engaging in more 
contentious activities as outsiders. 
 We include the following independent variables in our analysis according our discussion 
above. At the level of AAOs, we include four variables: we measure their degree of formalization 
and professionalization through the presence of a written constitution, paid staff, their thematic 
focus by distinguishing between economic (to reduce the negative impacts of the economic crisis, 
austerity cuts; to reduce poverty and exclusion; to promote alternative economic practices, lifestyles 
and values, economic empowerment; and to promote alternative noneconomic practices, lifestyles 
and values) and other (all remaining) activities, and the scope of their activities through an ordinal 
variable (local, regional, national, supranational). Information on these four variables stem from 
our content analysis of websites of AAOs. At the contextual level, we include six variables: the 
quarterly GDP as percentage change from the previous period and the unemployment rate as 
percentage of the labor force to captures the economic crisis, the public social spending as 
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percentage of the GDP and the tax wedge as percentage of the labor cost to grasp austerity 
policies, and the political stability index and the government effectiveness index to measure 
perceived political opportunities. Information on these six variables, which varies across 
countries, was retrieved on https://data.oecd.org and http://www.theglobaleconomy.com. The 
contextual measures refer to 2014. 
Our analysis is divided in two parts: a first, descriptive part in which we show variations 
in the three forms of advocacy across countries, also in relation to the severity of the economic 
crisis in those countries, and a second, more explanatory part in which we run a number of 
multilevel logistic regression models for each of the three types of political activities. The 
country forms the group variable in the multilevel regressions. We include in the analysis the 
following countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the UK. These countries were hit to a different extent by the economic crisis. In particular, the 
three southern European countries were much more harshly hit, while the other countries had to 
face a weak to intermediate crisis. Furthermore, the same countries that were more strongly hit by 
the crisis are also those in which austerity policies implemented by governments have gone the 
farthest. 
 
Three types of political activities of alternative action organizations and their variations 
across countries 
This section examines variations in the use of the three forms of advocacy by AAOs across 
countries as well as across degrees of severity of the economic crisis. In addition, we also show 
how the characteristics of AAOs vary according to these two criteria. 
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 Table 1 shows how the three types of political activities vary across the nine countries of 
our study. Overall we observe a much higher frequency in raising awareness in all nine countries, 
while both lobbying and protest activities being employed less often. Most importantly, there are 
important differences across countries in all three forms. Raising awareness is more frequent in 
Poland, followed by Greece and Spain. Swedish and Swiss AAOs also make a fair usage of this 
form of advocacy, while the latter is less frequent in France, Germany, and Italy. 
Table 1 
 Similarly important and perhaps even stronger variations exist concerning lobbying. Here 
we observe a strong contrast between Sweden, Switzerland and UK, on the one hand, and all 
other countries (with the partial exception of Germany), on the other. While AAOs in the former 
three countries are strongly committed to lobbying activities, this form of advocacy is less 
popular in the other countries. 
 The cross-national variations in the use of protest activities are perhaps even more 
striking. Moreover, here we can observe a clear-cut pattern: AAOs in the three southern 
European countries seem to be much more protest-oriented than elsewhere. Thus, Italian, but 
especially Greek and Spanish AAOs make use of protest activities to a much larger extent than 
their counterparts in the other six countries. This suggests that these similarities and differences 
group in some way according to the severity of the crisis faced by the countries, at least for some 
of these political activities. This holds in particular for lobbying and protesting, as lobbying 
activities are most often used when the crisis was weak, while protest activities are much more 
frequent in countries facing a strong crisis. 
 Before we move to the regression models, we would like to take a look at variations in the 
organizational variables included in the models. Table 2 shows how the two indicators of the 
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degree of formalization and professionalization of AAOs as well as their focus on economic aims 
vary across the nine countries. All three variables show strong cross-national variations, 
suggesting that context impacts on specific features of AAOs. Greek, but especially Spanish and 
British AAOs are characterized by a lower level of formalization as not many of them possess a 
written constitution. In the case of the UK, this might be explained by the constitutional tradition 
of the countries (the UK does not have a written constitution), while the other two countries 
might suggest a link with the economic crisis (but see the case of Italy). 
Table 2 
 These differences are only partly reflected in the presence of paid staff. Here we observe 
clearly a higher share of AAOs that have paid staff in Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, while 
this share is much smaller in all other countries and especially so in Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Spain. In other words, AAOs in these countries seems less professionalized than in the other 
countries. 
 Overall, most of the AAOs tend to focus on economic aims rather than on other aims such 
as, for example, combating discrimination, increasing tolerance and mutual understanding, or 
promoting alternative non-economic practices, lifestyles, and values. In particular, Greek AAOs 
(but also Polish, Swedish, and British ones) are less focused on economic aims than their 
counterparts in other countries. These organizational characteristics could be associated to the 
severity of the economic crisis. However, this might be true of the two indicators of formalization 
and professionalization, but not for the focus on economic aims. Yet, the two indicators point to 
opposing directions. While AAOs in countries more strongly affected by the crisis were more 
likely to have a written constitution than their counterparts in more weakly affected countries, 
they also are less likely to have paid staff than in the other two situations. 
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 Finally, we can take a look at the scope of the activities carried out by AAOs. Table 3 
shows the cross-national variations of this variable. Overall, most organizations focus on the 
local level. This is hardly surprising as this is the level where the kind of activities carried out by 
AAOs are most effective. Activities at the regional and national levels vary depending on the 
country, while supranational activities are less frequent than those referring to the other three 
levels except in one country, namely Switzerland. 
Table 3 
 In terms of cross-national variations, we observe a higher share of local activities 
especially in Germany, Greece, and Italy. However, differences are not huge. They are more 
substantial when it comes to the regional and national levels. Regional activities are particularly 
important in Poland, but to some extent also in Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, while national 
activities are more frequent in France, Sweden, and the UK. Finally, as already noted, 
Switzerland stands out as regards supranational activities, followed by France, while this level is 
less important in the other countries. This suggests that the scope of activities of AAOs might be 
in part related to the severity of the economic crisis. Specifically, local activities are more 
frequent in countries more strongly affected by the crisis. Regional and national activities, in 
contrast, seem more popular where the crisis was not as strong, but the patterns are far from being 
clear-cut in this respect. Supranational activities are also less frequent in countries that have faced 
a stronger crisis, although their overall level is lower in all countries except in Switzerland. 
 
Explaining the political orientation of alternative action organizations 
The main goal of this paper is to gauge the potential impact of certain characteristics of AAOs 
and particularly the role of certain contextual features for explaining whether AAOs engage in 
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the three different forms of political advocacy. We do so by means of three sets of random-
intercept logistic regressions whereby observations are clustered by country. Each set is made of 
seven models: the first one only includes the organizational predictors, while each of the six 
subsequent models adds in turn one of the six contextual predictors. The latter are included one 
by one in separate models to avoid possible multicollinearity problems. The coefficients shown 
are odds ratios, which lend themselves to interpretation more easily than log-odds (when the odds 
ratio is higher than one the effect is positive, when it is lower than one it is negative, and when it 
equals 1 there is no difference). 
 Table 4 shows the results for raising awareness as dependent variable. As we can see in 
the first model, most of the organizational variables have a significant effect on this form of 
advocacy. A certain degree of formalization, as seen in the existence of a written constitution, 
seem to favor the engagement of AAOs in activities geared towards raising awareness towards 
their aims. Having paid staff, however, has no significant effect, suggesting that a higher degree 
of professionalization in this respect does not matter for this type of political activities. AAOs 
that have economic aims are significantly less likely to be committed to raising awareness than 
AAOs that privilege other aims. Finally, locally-oriented AAOs are significantly less likely to 
engage in this type of activities that those whose activities have a broader scope. This can be seen 
in the significant and positive coefficients for regional, national, and supranational scope as 
opposed to the local scope, which is the reference category of this variable. All these effects hold 
across the other models. 
Table 4 
 When we introduce the six contextual variables in the other models, the results are less 
clear-cut. Of the six contextual predictors, only one displays a statistically significant effect, 
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namely unemployment, although the magnitude of the effect is not very large. Thus raising 
awareness, as a form of advocacy, does not seem to be very much influenced by the broader 
context, neither in terms of economic crisis, nor in terms of austerity policies or political 
opportunities. 
 Table 5 shows the results for lobbying. In this case, all organizational predictors have a 
statistically significant effect, including the presence of paid staff, which makes the engagement 
of AAOs in this type of political activities more likely. The effect of the other variables is similar 
to the one observed earlier. Here we find however more effects on the side of the contextual 
predictors as GDP growth and the two measures of political opportunities (political stability and 
government effectiveness) are all significantly and positively associated with a higher likelihood 
to engage in lobbying. Concerning the latter two, in particular, the higher the perceived political 
stability and government effectiveness, the more likely are AAOs to engage in lobbying 
activities. In addition, at a 90% significance level, the unemployment rate, social spending, and 
tax wedge also have an impact. Thus, if we somewhat relax the criteria for statistical significance, 
all contextual variables seem to matter for this type of political activity. 
Table 5 
 Finally, Table 6 shows the result for protesting. In this case, the organizational predictors 
have a lower explanatory power as only the aims and the scope of activities are statistically 
significant. Specifically, just as for raising awareness and lobbying, AAOs who have economic 
aims are less likely to be engaged in protesting than AAOs who have other aims. Moreover, 
AAOs with regional activities are also less likely to do this form of advocacy than those with a 
local scope. Concerning the contextual predictors, three of them are significantly associated with 
protesting. GDP growth and perceived government effectiveness make protesting less likely, 
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while unemployment makes it more likely. It is interesting to note that the latter variable has an 
opposite effect than when used to explain lobbying. 
Table 6 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the involvement of AAOs in three forms of political advocacy in an 
attempt to gauge their degree of politicization. These forms can be understood as representing 
three different ways of making political claims: by raising public awareness with respect to a 
given cause or issue, by trying to influence the policy maker through “insider” lobbying 
activities, and by protesting in the streets as “outsiders.” We first conducted descriptive analyses 
showing how AAOs’ engagement in raising awareness, lobbying, and protesting vary across 
countries, also in relation to the severity of the economic crisis in those countries. Secondly, we 
performed a number of multilevel logistic regression models for each of the three types of 
political activities. 
 Our findings show strong cross-national variations in all three forms of political activities, 
although not always following a consistent pattern. They also suggest that there is a relationship 
between the severity of the economic crisis and the form of advocacy. In particular, lobbying is 
more frequent in those countries less severely hit by the crisis, whereas protesting is more often 
used in countries that were more harshly hit. We also showed variations in certain characteristics 
of AAOs such as their degree of formalization and professionalization, or their focus on 
economic aims, and the geographical scope of their activities across countries and depending on 
the severity of the economic crisis. In particular, possessing a written constitution was more 
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frequent in countries that  experienced a deeper crisis, whereas having paid staff was  more often 
observed in countries that faced a weaker crisis. 
Most importantly, our analysis suggests that the politicization of AAOs depends both on 
certain internal characteristics such as their degree of formalization and professionalization, as 
well as their thematic focus, and the scope of their activities, and on the broader context in terms 
of economic crisis, austerity policies, and political opportunities. As regards the latter, we found 
an impact especially on lobbying and protesting. To be sure, there are many other factors – both 
internal and external – that may determine or at least channel the politicization of AAOs, as that 
of any other kind of organization for that matter. For example, on the internal side, this might 
depend on the specific and often contingent composition of the organizations’ directorates, who 
might be more or less inclined to invest in political activities. Also, there might be path 
dependency insofar as the kinds of activities carried out by a given organization at time t1 might 
be influenced by wheter they used to do previously, at time t0. On the external side, the national 
political culture as well as other aspects of the political opportunity structure, such as for 
example, the configuration of political alignments at a given moment in time (Kriesi et al. 1995; 
Tarrow 1989) might either encourage or discourage AAOs to get involved in political activities. 
In this paper, however, we were mostly interested in examining the connections between the 
degree of internal structuration, thematic focus and the action scope of AAOs, their economic and 
institutional context, and the likelihood that they become active on the political scene. This 
stemmed from a theoretical choice, but was also partly constrained by the availability of 
information in our data. 
In addition to the limitations stemming from the information available in the data, we 
should also stress that our analysis rests on the way in which AAOs have been sampled. While 
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we cannot say to what extent and how, for sure sampling affects our findings. For example, by 
including only organizations that have online presence, our sample might leave out certain types 
of other organizations. Furthermore, it was hard to determine to what extent the organizations 
included in the sample have a long tradition of contentious political action, as opposed to others 
that are newcomenrs in this respect. We nonetheless believe that we have provided evidence of 
the political engagement, of AAOs, in addition to their social engagement, and how their degree 
of politicization varies depending on the types of political activities as well as depending on 
certain of their organizational features and of their broader environment.   
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Table 1: Cross-national variations of three types of political activities of AAO (percentages) 
 
 
France Germany Greece Italy Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland UK 
Raising awareness 42.8 37.6 64.6 42.2 75.1 61.0 50.5 55.6 41.2 
Lobbying 2.2 8.6 3.00 1.8 4.6 2.8 18.9 12.6 15.2 
Protesting 2.2 4.2 28.80 19.6 9.8 32.5 3.1 9.0 2.0 
N 500 498 500 500 498 459 509 333 500 
Pearson chi2 = 256.563, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.244 (raising awareness) 
Pearson chi2 = 225.736, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.229 (lobbying) 
Pearson chi2 = 496.614, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.340 (protesting) 
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Table 2: Cross-national variations in three characteristics of AAO (percentages) 
 
 
France Germany Greece Italy Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland UK 
Written constitution 28.2 24.3 10.4 36.8 27.3 4.8 36.4 39.0 2.8 
Paid staff 13.4 8.4 7.2 5.8 12.5 4.6 52.5 36.6 30.8 
Economic aim 78.0 76.7 57.4 76.8 57.8 72.6 50.9 75.1 50.0 
N 500 498 500 500 498 459 509 333 500 
Pearson chi2 = 717.543, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.409 (paid staff) 
Pearson chi2 = 413.552, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.310 (written constitution) 
Pearson chi2 = 243.449, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.238 (economic aim) 
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Table 3: Cross-national variations of the scope of activities of AAO (percentages) 
 
 
France Germany Greece Italy Poland Spain Sweden Switzerland UK 
Local 69.1 81.1 79.5 84.4 57.2 73.9 61.0 67.3 61.5 
Regional 7.9 7.6 13.1 5.1 30.3 19.2 17.6 19.0 10.7 
National 17.4 10.0 6.2 7.6 9.2 5.0 20.4 4.3 24.8 
Supranational 5.6 1.3 1.2 3.0 3.2 1.9 1.0 9.3 3.1 
N 482 450 482 436 435 422 490 300 488 
Pearson chi2 = 430.809, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.190 
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Table 4: Multilevel logistic regression models explaining raising awareness (odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Organizational level        
Written constitution 1.839*** 1.839*** 1.845*** 1.841*** 1.840*** 1.841*** 1.838*** 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) (0.159) (0.160) (0.159) 
Paid staff 1.140 1.140 1.146 1.135 1.135 1.142 1.147 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
Economic aims 0.715*** 0.715*** 0.714*** 0.716*** 0.715*** 0.715*** 0.715*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Scope (ref.: local)         
Regional 1.441*** 1.441*** 1.447*** 1.440*** 1.440*** 1.443*** 1.445*** 
 (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
National 2.321*** 2.321*** 2.323*** 2.320*** 2.320*** 2.320*** 2.321*** 
 (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) (0.257) 
Supranational 1.874** 1.874** 1.883** 1.870** 1.869** 1.876** 1.880** 
 (0.376) (0.376) (0.377) (0.375) (0.375) (0.376) (0.377) 
Contextual level        
GDP  1.000      
  (0.130)      
Unemployment   1.044*     
   (0.0213)     
Social spending    0.936    
    (0.0414)    
Tax wedge     0.979   
     (0.0211)   
Political stability      0.763  
      (0.379)  
Government effectiveness       0.649 
       (0.190) 
Constant 0.985 0.985 0.591* 5.248 2.330 1.169 1.702 
 (0.198) (0.252) (0.175) (5.927) (2.050) (0.435) (0.701) 
Sigma_u 0.566 0.566 0.459 0.504 0.536 0.557 0.505 
Rho 0.089 0.089 0.060 0.072 0.080 0.086 0.072 
Log likelihood -2557.961 -2557.961 2556.173 -2556.956 -2557.485 -2557.815 -2556.981 
Observations 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 
Number of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 5: Multilevel logistic regression models explaining lobbying (odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Organizational level        
Written constitution 2.366*** 2.349*** 2.328*** 2.368*** 2.370*** 2.304*** 2.327*** 
 (0.359) (0.355) (0.353) (0.359) (0.359) (0.351) (0.351) 
Paid staff 1.557** 1.554** 1.553** 1.565** 1.553** 1.551** 1.543** 
 (0.230) (0.228) (0.228) (0.231) (0.229) (0.228) (0.226) 
Economic aims 0.667** 0.672** 0.665** 0.667** 0.666** 0.663** 0.656** 
 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) 
Scope (ref.: local)         
Regional 3.280*** 3.254*** 3.292*** 3.253*** 3.256*** 3.267*** 3.290*** 
 (0.562) (0.558) (0.565) (0.558) (0.558) (0.560) (0.564) 
National 5.316*** 5.287*** 5.295*** 5.344*** 5.335*** 5.348*** 5.298*** 
 (0.853) (0.847) (0.849) (0.857) (0.856) (0.858) (0.849) 
Supranational 4.967*** 4.936*** 4.893*** 4.927*** 4.886*** 4.900*** 4.812*** 
 (1.411) (1.400) (1.389) (1.401) (1.390) (1.391) (1.367) 
Contextual level        
GDP  1.448**      
  (0.204)      
Unemployment   0.946     
   (0.0285)     
Social spending    0.901    
    (0.0553)    
Tax wedge     0.954   
     (0.0265)   
Political stability      3.260*  
      (1.919)  
Government effectiveness       2.825*** 
       (0.869) 
Constant 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.055*** 0.394 0.187 0.0135*** 0.008*** 
 (0.00846) (0.00545) (0.0239) (0.615) (0.211) (0.00619) (0.00354) 
Sigma_u 0.775 0.559 0.640 0.670 0.668 0.629 0.475 
Rho 0.154 0.087 0.111 0.120 0.120 0.107 0.064 
Log likelihood -880.352 -877.748 -878.951 -879.055 -879.061 -878.675 -876.662 
Observations 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 
Number of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6: Multilevel logistic regression models explaining protesting (odds ratios) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Organizational level        
Written constitution 0.877 0.878 0.890 0.878 0.878 0.881 0.878 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.129) 
Paid staff 0.687 0.691 0.690 0.686 0.686* 0.690 0.696 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) 
Economic aims 0.640*** 0.637*** 0.642*** 0.641*** 0.640*** 0.641*** 0.642*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) 
Scope (ref.: local)         
Regional 0.390*** 0.392*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0727) (0.0730) (0.0728) (0.0726) (0.0727) (0.0728) (0.0728) 
National 1.003 1.001 0.994 1.004 1.003 1.000 0.999 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.191) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) 
Supranational 0.608 0.609 0.615 0.608 0.608 0.610 0.612 
 (0.224) (0.225) (0.227) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225) (0.226) 
        
Contextual level        
GDP  0.627*      
  (0.139)      
Unemployment   1.123***     
   (0.0375)     
Social spending    0.957    
    (0.0984)    
Tax wedge     0.993   
     (0.0471)   
Political stability      0.342  
      (0.337)  
Government effectiveness       0.290* 
       (0.156) 
Constant 0.142*** 0.252*** 0.036*** 0.429 0.190 0.281 0.679 
 (0.0584) (0.108) (0.0177) (1.125) (0.368) (0.207) (0.507) 
Sigma_u 1.185 0.958 0.752 1.174 1.184 1.107 0.930 
Rho 0.299 0.218 0.147 0.295 0.299 0.271 0.208 
Log likelihood -1232.673 -1230.869 -1228.894 -1232.583 -1232.661 -1232.122 -1230.582 
Observations 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 3985 
Number of countries 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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